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LAW SUMMARY
Keeping PACE: Federal Mortgage Lenders
Halt Local Clean Energy Programs
IAN M. LARSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
Due to rapid technological improvements and growing concerns over
global warming and per capita energy consumption, low-energy appliances

and environmental retrofits have become increasingly available to homeowners in the past few years. During this period, there has been a concomitant rise in the number of programs available for financing such improvements. In the burgeoning market for clean energy, no program has proved as
dynamic 4 or controversial5 as property assessed clean energy (PACE) financ* B.A., University of Missouri, 2009; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2012; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2011-12. 1am extremely grateful to Professor R. Wilson Freyermuth for his advice and guidance in writing
this Law Summary and to my wife Abby and daughter Haley for their love, patience,
and support.
1. An environmental retrofit consists of improving an energy-consuming product by replacing inefficiencies with parts, devices, or equipment not available at the
time the product was manufactured. Merriam-Webster, Retrofit, http://www.merriam
-webster.com/dictionary/retrofit (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
2. The myriad of retrofits currently available to homeowners includes improved
heating/air-conditioning systems, water systems, insulation, storm windows, improved roofing, solar hot water tanks, geothermal pumps, and solar panels. Brian
Coppa, Recovery Through Retrofit Program Offers Numerous Homeowner Benefits,

EXAMINER.COM, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/green-business-inphoenix/recovery-through-retrofit-program-offers-numerous-homeowner-benefits.
3. See News Release, Rep. Steve Israel, Rep. Israel Speaks About Property
Assessed Clean Energy Bonds at Forum on Financingfor Clean Energy Building

Retrofits (Nov. 11, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 22551557 ("There are more
[than] 150 energy efficiency financing programs in the United States.").
4. See Cisco DeVries & Christopher Lynch, How Cool: Changes to Municipal
Finance Law Address Global Warming, Create Green Jobs and Promote Energy
Independence, BLOOMBERG L. REP., 2010, at 1, http://pacenow.org/documents/

Bloomberg%20Law%2OArticle.pdf ("Municipal finance ... has the potential ...
[using] an innovative municipal finance model[,] to encourage local property owners
to do their part to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.").
5. Jeffrey Tomich, Energy Efficiency Initiative May Falter U.S. Housing
Finance Agency, Others Are Leery of PACE Liens' Priority Over Mortgages, ST.

Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 18, 2010, at El ("[PACE] has spooked mortgage giants
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ing. PACE, a local government initiative now established in twenty-two
states, expands upon traditional land-secured finance authority for the purpose of improving household and commercial energy efficiency. PACE
programs provide bond-financed funding to qualifying property owners for
the purpose of financing energy improvements.7 Under such a program, the
cost of qualified energy improvements is added as an assessment tax to the
owner's yearly property tax bill, with the obligation to pay being secured by a
lien on the encumbered property.8
The controversy surrounding PACE programs stems from the nature of
local assessment law and the doctrine of "tax lien seniority"; because the
PACE program administers funds to homeowners via assessments against
their property, rather than as loans to the homeowners, municipalities are
entitled to senior status in the case of default. 9 This controversy culminated
in July 2010, when federal mortgage lenders, the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), 10 and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac),' acting under the supervision of their regulatory agency,
the Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA), 12 refused to purchase any
mortgages encumbered by a PACE lien.13

and FHFA."). FHFA is the Federal Housing Finance Authority, overseer of "mortgage giants" the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Association. See id
6. See, e.g., SANJAY RANCHOD ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPERTY
ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE) PROGRAMS UNDER FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA
LAW: A WHITE PAPER 2-4 (2010), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/
1622.pdfwt.mcID=1622.pdf. Some states list specific energy improvements avail-

able for PACE financing, while some states more generally limit the program's availability to "energy efficiency improvements." Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20603(1) (2011), with CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 26104 (West 2011), and Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 67.2820 (West 2011).
7. See, e.g., Kim McGuire, Going Green Within Means: Missouri Bills Would
Allow Home, Business Owners to Finance Energy-Efficient or Renewable-Energy
Systems Over 20 Years, ST. LOUis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 22, 2010, at Al.
8. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 2.
9. DeVries & Lynch, supra note 4, at 2 ("[PACE] repayment is secured as a

senior lien against the property, which means that the bonds receive repayment priority should property owners default on tax and/or mortgage payments."). This means
that mortgagors and private lenders become subordinate to PACE liens, regardless of
which party is "first in time." Id.
10. See About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index;jsessionid=
VCC50JILGOWL3J2FECISFGA?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Feb. 22,
2011).
I1. See About Freddie Mac, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company

profile/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
12. See About FHFA, http://fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=4 (last visited Feb. 23,
2011).
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Missouri citizens have a special interest in the outcome of this dispute,
as Missouri was the last of twenty-two states to pass PACE enabling legislation, a product of vociferous support by Missouri environmental interest
groups and small businesses that recognized the potential of spending initiatives in a recessed economy.14 Unfortunately, federal suspension of PACE
occurred almost simultaneously with Missouri's enactment of PACE legislation.1s Missouri lenders, legislators, homeowners, environmentalists, and
small businesses have thus been unable to move forward with a PACE program since federal lenders halted the initiative nationwide.
This Law Summary analyzes and comments upon the legal arguments
put forth by supporters and critics of PACE liens in the wake of the July 2010
disputes. Part H discusses the origins of PACE in 2008 and its rapid expansion across the United States, paying particular attention to the passage of
PACE legislation in Missouri. Part III analyzes the escalating dispute between PACE supporters and the federal mortgage lenders who oppose it,
commenting upon the legal arguments articulated by both sides. Part IV proposes a resolution to the conflict that provides a more secure position for federal mortgage groups while still allowing PACE to continue. This Law
Summary concludes that while federal mortgage groups overreacted to
PACE's potential dangers by unilaterally halting the programs, their substantive concerns are legitimate and both parties would be well-served by resuming negotiations so that PACE lending can continue providing a benefit to
worthy borrowers.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Mechanics of a PACE Lien
The starting point for any PACE program is the enactment of a PACE
enablinp statute, authorizing municipalities to establish PACE assessment
boards. Once receiving statutory authority, the municipality must develop a
source of capital from which the money for homeowner retrofits may be
tapped: many local governments have looked to bonds to provide that capital. 7 These bonds allow local governments to finance new energy improvements with private funds. The municipalities repay those bonds with interest
13. See infra notes 73-81; see also Letter from Patricia J. McClung, Vice Presi-

dent, Offerings Mgmt., Freddie Mac, to Freddie Mac Seller/Servicers (May 5, 2010),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/iltr05051O.pdf.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part ll.C-D.
RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
Mark Zimring & Merrian Fuller, Accelerating the Payment of PACE Assess-

ments, CLEAN ENERGY FINANCING POLICY BRIEF (Lawrence Berkeley National La-

boratory, Berkeley, CA), May 4, 2010, at 2, http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/eepolicybrief 050410.pdf.
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provided from assessment payments made by homeowners as part of their
yearly property tax bill.' 8
In Missouri, a homeowner seeking to take advantage of such a program
would first obtain an energy audit to verify his need for energy-efficient improvements and then apply with a local PACE assessment board for consideration.' 9 Having obtained approval, a borrower would receive a payout from
the municipal board in the amount of the proposed improvement. o Repayment would consist of a yearly supplement to the homeowner's property tax
bill, typically for up to twenty years.21
The promise to repay is secured by a tax lien filed by the municipal
board against the homeowner's property. This means that repaying the debt
is an obligation on the benefitted property, not the individual taking out the
loan. 2 3 If the property is foreclosed upon, or the property owner fails to pay
his property taxes (resulting in foreclosure), the PACE lien would take seniority over the mortgage, and the amount past due would be paid first to the municipality.24 The remaining balance of the lien would stay with the property
and be paid by subsequent purchasers of the land.25

B. CaliforniaPioneersPACE Financing
The first PACE program was established in Berkeley, California in
2008.26 The program was immediately popular,27 and Berkeley's local assessment board granted its first PACE bond in January 2009.28 The program

18. Id.; see also DeVries & Lynch, supra note 4, at 4.
19. Tomich, supra note 5. For more on the approval process, see infra Part
IV.A.3.
20. See Tomich, supra note 5.
2 1. Id.
22. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
23. Id.

24. See, e.g., PACENow, Presentation to the Senate Banking Committee, Property Assessed Clean Energy Districts: States Rights, Benefits & Responses to
available at
at
16 (July 22, 2010),
FHFA/Regulator Overreach,
http://pacenow.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/7.22. 10-PACE-Banking-CommitteePPT.pdf.
25. Id.

26. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 26100(a)(2) (West 2011); PACENow, Brief History
of PACE, http://pacenow.org/blog/2010/07/brief-history-of-pace/ (last visited Feb 22,
2011).
27. All available borrower slots in the program were filled within nine minutes.
DeVries & Lynch, supra note 4, at 5.
28. PACENow, supra note 26. PACENow, a not-for-profit interest group,
"work[s] to accelerate the development of the PACE industry through the development of the asset class and nationwide adoption of PACE finance programs." PACENow, Job Description, Executive Director, http://pacenow.org/documents/CMI%20
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raised capital through the issuance of municipal bonds for the purpose of
providing low-interest energy efficiency loans to local homeowners, administered by municipal "clean energy" boards.2 9 In early 2009, the program was
copied in select cities and counties across California, 30 and shortly thereafter
the program went statewide.3 1 During the following two years, twenty-two
states followed suit by enacting some form of PACE legislation. 3 2

Sr/o20%20Financial%2OPolicy/o20Specialist%20%20-%20January/o202010%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
29. PACENow, About PACE, http://pacenow.org/blog/about-pace/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011).
30. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 26100(a)(2) ("[Tihe City and County of San Francisco, City of San Diego, City of Palm Desert, Sonoma County, and the California
Statewide Communities Development Authority (CSCDA) have already initiated or
are working to launch additional programs.").
31. See id.; id. §§ 26100-26141 (outlining California's PACE program). California's PACE program has proven to be one of the most popular in the country; as of
June 2010, Sonoma County alone has contracted for $24 million in energy-efficient
retrofits. Ethan N. Elkind, Fannie, Freddie Blocking Progresson Clean Energy, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 18, 2010, at 14A.
32. See, e.g., PACENow, supra note 24, at 19. Arizona, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin currently have enacted PACE legislation.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-572 (2011); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 26100-26141;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-601.5 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 189.402
(West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-62-2 (2011); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-11 (West
2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, §§ 10151-10162 (2010); MD. CODE ANN. art.
24, §§ 9-1501 to -1507 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. § 216C.43-.436 (West 2010);
MO. REV. STAT. § 67.2810-.2835 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271.010.630 (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53-F:1-:8 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4-55C-1 to -8 (West 2010); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-gg (McKinney 2011);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 153A-210.1 to -210.7 (West 2010); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1710.01-.13 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 460.1-.7 (West 2011); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 223.396 (West 2011); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 376.001.008 (Vernon 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 8002-8003 (2010); VA. CODE. ANN. §
15.2-958.3 (2011); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.0627 (West 2011); see also HOME
PERFORMANCE RES. CTR., PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE) LEGISLATION
(2010), available at http://www.hprcenter.org/sites/default/files/ec-pro/hprcenter/
PACE legislation.pdf (excluding Arizona and including since-repealed Louisiana
(S.B. 224 )); Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a "Disruptive" Technology?:
The Casefor Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 53, 84 n.160
(2010); PACENow, PACE Programs by State, http://pacenow.orgfblog/2010/07/
pace-programs-by-state/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
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C PACE's Rapid Expansion
PACE bonds rely upon the municipality's inherent power to levy special
tax assessments against properties that lie within its jurisdiction. This power exists in many municipal governments around the country34 and has been
recognized for more than one hundred years.
Traditional special tax assessments have been used to finance public improvements such as sewers,
sidewalks, road repaving, seismic retrofitting, and fire safety improvements.36
One of the disconcerting issues for lenders regarding the current status
of clean energy bonds is how quickly states moved to pass PACE enabling
statutes. The following chart demonstrates the rapidity with which enabling
bills were passed in each of PACE's three operational years.3 7
PACE Enabling Bills Passed from 2008-2010
State (Legislation)

Date of

Status

Legislation

California (A.B. 811)
Colorado (H.B. 08-1350)
Virginia (S.B. 1212)
Maryland (H.B. 1567)
Oklahoma (S.B. 668)
New Mexico (H.B. 572)
Wisconsin (A.B. 255)
Nevada (S.B. 358)
Vermont (H. 161)
Texas (H.B. 1937)
Louisiana (S.B. 224)
Ohio (H.B. 1)
Oregon (H.B. 2626)
Illinois (S.B. 583)
North Carolina (S.B. 97)
New York (S66004A)
Alaska (S.B. 212)
South Carolina (H. 4472)
New Jersey (A. 2502)
Maine (L.B. 1717)

2008
5/08
3/30/09
4/09
4/28/09
4/9/09
5/15/09
5/28/09
5/28/09
6/19/09
7/6/09
7/20/09
7/22/09
8/14/09
8/26/09
11/16/09
1/19/10
1/28/10
3/15/10
3/29/10

Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Repealed
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Introduced
Introduced
Introduced
Enacted

33. See Elkind, supra note 31.
34. Estimates suggest that as of 2010, a total of 37,000 municipal organizations
have existing assessment powers and would be capable of issuing PACE loans given
the appropriate enabling legislation. Editorial, Congress Must Save Clean-Energy
Loan Program,SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 13, 2010, at 7A.
35. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (citing Ronald H. Rosenberg, The
Changing Culture ofAmerican Land Use Regulation: Payingfor Growth with Impact

Fees, 59 SMU L. REv. 177, 217 n.138 (2006)).
36. Id.

37. See supra note 32 and sources cited therein.
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Minnesota (H.F. 2695)
Massachusetts (H.B. 4526)
Michigan (H.B. 5640)
Hawaii (H.B. 2643)
New Hampshire (H.B. 1554)
Missouri (H.B. 1692)
Georgia (H.B. 1388)
Florida (H.B. 7179)

KEEPING PACE
4/1/10
4/22/10
4/22/10
4/8/10
5/12/10
5/14/10
5/20/10
5/28/10

605
Enacted
Passed House
Passed House
In Senate Committee
Passed House/Senate
Enacted
Enacted
Enacted

However, while almost half the states have enabled PACE programs, actual active PACE programs are rare: as of May 2010, less than ten active programs were in existence, each located in either California, Colorado, or New
York.38 Rather than indicative of an unwillingness to initiate PACE programs, the small number of operational programs is probably reflective of the
rapid enactment of PACE enabling legislation, 39 as well as the slower local
processes of establishing boards and issuing bonds, given that one-quarter of
all enabling statutes were not passed until the 2010 sessions.40
According to PACE supporters, the government's inherent power to assess taxes not only gave municipalities the capacity to establish PACE boards
but also gave board-approved bonds seniority over any outstanding landsecured debts.41 The seniority of municipal assessments effectively means
that the lender's private mortgage loans are instantly subordinated to the mu42
nicipality. Seniority is premised on the distinction made by the PACE programs between lending and assessments: any loans would follow the "first-intime, first-in-right" principle that gives seniority to any antecedent loan. 43

38. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 ("Eight active PACE programs currently
are in place: Berkeley, CA; Palm Desert, CA; Placer County, CA; San Francisco, CA;
Santa Barbara County, CA; Sonoma County, CA; Yucaipa, CA; Boulder, CO; and
Babylon, NY.").
39. All PACE programs currently operating lie in states with enabling statutes
passed in either 2008 or 2009. See HOME PERFORMANCE RES. CTR., supra note 32.
40. Id. As discussed infra Part III, unilateral action by federal lending authorities
halted any progress towards the establishment of new PACE boards as of May 2010.
This further demonstrates that the small number of operational PACE programs is not
truly reflective of the program's popularity. For instance, Missouri's PACE enabling
legislation was signed into law within one week of an effective halt to all PACE lending. See infra Parts I.D, Ill.
41. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
42. Id. An important caveat, noted by supporters of the PACE loan programs
and discussed infra at Part IV.A.2, is that private lenders are only subordinated by the
amount of the loan in arrears, or the amount defaulted on. The remaining balance of
the loan "stays with" the land and is an encumbrance taken by any subsequent purchaser of the property. PACENow, supra note 24, at 20.
43. See U.S. ex rel. IRS v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 449 (1993) ("Absent provision to the contrary, priority .. . is governed by the common-law principle that 'the
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Under the state assessment power, however, the state is entitled to be reimbursed prior to any existing mortgages, regardless of chronology.44
Municipal bonds rely on private investment as a tool for raising money
and are attractive to investors because they ensure regular returns on a relatively safe investment. PACE programs are particularly attractive to investors because they offer the added assurance of senior lien status.45 Municipal
bonds backed by property taxes traditionally have experienced low default
rates,46 and the assurance of being repaid first even when default occurs pro47
vides a prime incentive for investors. PACE supporters argue that this seniority ensures the program's viability and its attractiveness as an investment
vehicle; as explained in one lawsuit recently filed against FHFA, first lien
priority is critical to the program's success because "there is currently almost
no demand in the secondary market for conventional junior mortgage instruments."
In contrast, there has been great demand for senior mortgage instruments: as of April 2010, $300 million worth of PACE bonds had been
sold in the State of California, and that number has been predicted (by its
supporters) to reach several billion dollars within the next few years.49
By the fall of 2009, commentators had begun to spread the word about
PACE's potential.50 Environmentalists and interest groups began to advocate
for the establishment of PACE programs as both an opportunity to reduce
energy consumption and to spur economic growth through increased retrofitting projects.5 Sensing the mood, Vice President Joe Biden, as head of the

first in time is the first in right."') (quoting United States v. City of New Britain,
Conn., 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954)).
44. See, e.g., Dunlap v. County of Gallatin, 15 111.7, 9 (1853) ("A tax is not an
ordinary debt. It is levied for the support of government, and takes precedence of all

other demands against the owner.").
45. See Rep. Israel Speaks About Property Assessed Clean Energy Bonds at
Forum on Financingfor Clean Energy Building Retrofits, supra note 3. Investor

groups, especially real estate investment trusts (REITs), have expressed interest in the
program. Id. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts officially
endorsed the PACE lending program. Id.
46. Teresa M. Amabile et al., Breakthrough Ideas for 2010, HARV. Bus. REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 41, 52.
47. First lien status effectively turns the investment into a securitized loan. See
Green Consultant Touts Energy Bonds, REAL ESTATE FIN. & INV. NEWS, Apr. 15,
2010, availableat 2010 WLNR 9352451.

48. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 12, Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 10 Civ. 7647 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene 10100601a.pdf.
49. Green Consultant Touts Energy Bonds, supra note 47.
50. See, e.g., Coppa, supra note 2.
5 1. Id.
[M]ore attractive finance offers are necessary . . . [and will] provide[] a
plethora of long-term benefits for homeowners and the economy as a
whole.... [I]t is possible that this [PACE] program ... will be instrumen-
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Middle Class Task Force's Council on Environmental Quality, released the
"Recovery Through Retrofit" announcement on October 19, 2009, propelling
the federal government into the clean energy financing discussion. The task
force announced that the federal goal would be "[to] lay the groundwork for a
self-sustaining home energy efficiency retrofit industry" by "do[ing] for
homes what ENERGY STAR@ has done for appliances."53
Following release of Vice President Biden's report, the White House allocated $80 billion of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
funds to assist local governments in implementing clean energy municipal
board programs.54 However, with federal funds came federal conditions,
expressed in a White House Policy Framework that contained preferred underwriting standards for emerging PACE programs. 5 The White House Policy Framework included three guidelines intended to protect individual homeowners 56 and eight guidelines intended to protect lenders; 57 it is these guidetal in aiding in the recovery of the U.S. economy. Also, it will allow
homeowners to build equity faster in their homes, which will ultimately
improve consumer spending, which fuels the overall economy.
Id.
52. MIDDLE CLASS TASK FORCE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, RECOVERY
THROUGH RETROFIT 5 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/docum
ents/RecoveryThrough Retrofit Final Report.pdf [hereinafter RECOVERY THROUGH
RETROFIT]. The report stated that "[h]ome retrofits can potentially help people earn
money, as home retrofit workers, while also helping them save money, by lowering
their utility bills. By encouraging nationwide weatherization of homes, workers ...
will participate in ramping up a national home retrofit market." Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 1-2. "ENERGY STAR is a joint program of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy [that operates] as a voluntary
labeling program designed to identify and promote energy-efficient products to reduce greenhouse gas emissions." EPA & Dep't of Energy, History of Energy Star,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=about.ab history (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
54. RECOVERY THROUGH RETROFIT, supra note 52, at 2.
55. Policy Framework for PACE Financing Programs (Oct. 18, 2009),
http://pacenow.org/documents/PACE Principles.pdf. The White House described the
role of federal funds as one that would "facilitate the collection of data, objectively
measure and evaluate the performance of PACE programs, and speed the adoption of
more uniform and universal best practices that include robust and effective homeowner and lender protections." Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 4-5. The three guidelines advocated for homeowner protection are (1)
borrowing only in the cases of savings-to-investment ratios greater than one, thus
maintaining "pay for itself' status and increasing homeowner cash flow; (2) limiting
borrowing to situations in which homeowners would be assured "high return[s] in
terms of energy efficiency gains"; and (3) assuring that the loans are performed in
accord with the manner in which they are requested through three measures: (i) predetermining the appropriateness of the project by a list of "presumptively-efficient
projects," or, alternatively, an energy audit; (ii) ensuring that only "validly licensed
contractors or installers" do the work; and (iii) conducting an "after-the-fact quality
assurance program." Id.
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lines that supporters would come to rely on as proof of PACE's inherent safety to lenders.

D. PACE Legislation Comes to Missouri
On February 17, 2010, PACE enabling legislation was introduced in the
Missouri House of Representatives.5 9 The bill spent five months in legislative committee before being sent to Governor Jay Nixon, who signed it into
law on July 12, 2010.60 Like other PACE programs, the final version of the
bill allows municipalities to establish clean energy development boards that
would fund energy efficiency and renewable energy improvements; these
loans would be financed through the issuance of bonds and repaid by special
assessment revenues.61
Missouri's PACE legislation generally operates in the same manner as
previously enacted PACE programs. As such, a property owner may be required to first obtain an energy audit of his or her property performed by a
57. Id. at 7-8. The eight guidelines directed at protecting lenders are (1) the
establishment of assessment reserve funds to protect investors against late and nonpayments; (2) limiting the bond term to the life expectancy of the energy benefit; (3)
limiting the size of the loan to ten percent of the property's fair-market value; (4)

ensuring that applicants hold clear title to the assessed property; (5) ensuring that all
borrowers are (i) current on property taxes, (ii) have no outstanding or unsatisfied tax
liens on the property, (iii) have no defaults in the past three years, and (iv) have no
outstanding mortgage debts; (6) avoiding granting bonds to homeowners who lack
equity in their properties; (7) avoiding lending in areas with high rates of default or
"underwater" homes; and (8) providing for the escrowing of PACE assessments in the
same manner that the homeowner escrows his or her property taxes. Id.
58. See infra Part IV.A.2
59. H.R. 2178, 95th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2010). Most of the push for a
Missouri PACE program came from Renew Missouri, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization formed "to advance efficiency and renewable energy" in the state. McGuire,
supra note 7; see also Renew Missouri: Advancing Efficiency and Renewable Energy, About Us, http://www.renewmo.org/about-usl.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
Renew Missouri operates as an independent project of the Missouri Coalition for the
Environment. McGuire, supra note 7; see also Missouri Coalition for the Environment, Mission and Objectives, http://www.moenviron.org/Reportonthelssues2007.asp
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
60. See S. 1037, 95th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2010). The relevant portion of
the bill was entitled "The Property Assessed Clean Energy Act." Id.
61. Id. Missouri's bill describes the applicable energy efficiency improvement
as including, but not limited to: wall, roof, attic, foundation or floor insulation; heating and cooling distribution systems; storm windows and doors "and other window
and door improvements designed to reduce energy consumption; [a]utomatic energy
control systems; heating, ventilating or air conditioning distribution system modifications and replacements; [c]aulking and weather-stripping; [r]eplacement or modification of lighting fixtures . .. ; [e]nergy recovery systems; [and] [d]aylighting systems."
Id. (subsections omitted).
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qualified home energy auditor.62 In order to be approved for a loan, this audit
must show that the benefit obtained by the energy improvement would meet
or exceed the total assessments that would be due under the assessment contract.63 Additional requirements include that (1) the prospective property
owner have good creditworthiness, (2) the property owner voluntarily agree
(i) to pay assessments for a period not to exceed twenty years and (ii) that
obligations "are a covenant that shall run with the land and be obligations
upon future owners of such property," and (3) the property subject to assessment not be subdivided unless the contract or amendment "divides the total
annual special assessment due between the newly subdivided parcels pro
rata" based upon the benefit received by each parcel.64 If approved, the assessment contract would be filed and recorded with the county recorder of
65
deeds.
Any such assessment constitutes a lien on the property and is collected "in the same manner and with the same priority as ad valorem real
property taxes." 66 Missouri's PACE enabling legislation goes further than
most states in that it limits the duration of a PACE assessment, mandates
cash-positivity, and requires borrower "creditworthiness"; however, significant gaps remain in the state's underwriting standards as compared to those
68
advised by the federal government.
Despite their general lack of stringent underwriting requirements, PACE
programs around the country enjoyed a relatively calm existence until May
2010. By the time Missouri's PACE bill had been signed, however, the turmoil over lien seniority had come to a head. In a St. Louis Post-Dispatch
article published on July 18, 2010 - a mere six days after Missouri's bill was
signed - journalist Jeffrey Tomich posed the question of whether Missouri's
"newest and boldest initiative to encourage energy savings" was "doomed
before it t[ook] root?" 69 Tomich had seen the writing on the wall: during
May and June, lending agencies had begun a movement to discourage PACE

62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.2820.4 (West 2011); see also Editorial, Green for
Green Our View: PACE Yourself for Savings on Missouri Utility Bills, ST. Louis
June 1, 2010, at Al0.
63. Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.2815.1. This is referred to as "cash flow positive"; that
is, the benefit conveyed by the energy improvement, evaluated by a dollar-for-dollar
POST-DISPATCH,

reduction in monthly energy bills to the homeowner, exceeds on a yearly basis the
annual amount of the assessment. See PACENow, supra note 24, at 9, 20. Cash flow
positive transactions thus improve the net worth of the borrower, improving his financial position vis-A-vis other lienholders and creditors. See id Whether a PACE lien
creates a "cash flow positive" transaction becomes crucial when local underwriting
standards fail to mandate cash flow positivity. See infra Part IV.A.3.
64. Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.2815.
65. Id. § 67.2815.4.
66. Id. § 67.2815.5.
67. Compare id. § 67.2815, with sources cited supra note 32.
68. See supra notes 56-57.

69. Tomich, supra note 5.
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programs. 70 Beginning with a Freddie Mac mortgage lender memorandum
issued on May 5,71 these developments effectively halted Missouri's PACE
program before it began.72
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On May 5, 2010, Freddie Mac issued an industry-wide memorandum
entitled "First Lien Mortgages and Energy Efficient Loans." 73 The letter
instructed all Freddie Mac lenders that energy efficiency PACE liens should
not be senior to mortgages delivered to Freddie Mac. 74 This position was
restated in Bulletin 2010-20, issued by Freddie Mac on August 31, 2010:
Freddie Mac supports the goal of encouraging responsible financing of energy efficient and renewable energy home improvements,
[but] we believe this goal may be achieved without altering the lien
priority status of first Mortgages or other underwriting requirements. To the extent necessary to mitigate greater risks associated
with PACE and PACE-like programs, Freddie Mac will take additional actions.
The bulletin went on to reiterate that Freddie Mac would refuse to purchase
mortgages secured by properties subject to any PACE obligations so long as
those obligations allowed for lien seniority.76
On July 6, 2010, FHFA followed Freddie Mac with a statement expressing concern over the lending priority of PACE liens. 7 7 Specifically, FHFA
stated that PACE "liens" are inherently dissimilar from routine tax assessments and that they "pose unusual and difficult risk management challenges
for lenders, servicers and mortgage securities investors."7 FHFA directed
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the Federal Home Loan Banks," to
70. See id.

71. McClung, supra note 13.
72. See Tomich, supra note 5.
73. McClung, supra note 13.
74. Id.

75. Freddie Mac Bulletin No. 2010-20 from Patricia J. McClung, Vice President,
Offerings Mgmt., Freddie Mac, to Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers (Aug. 31, 2010),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/billI020.pdf.
76. Id.

77. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy Retrofit Loan
Programs (Jul. 6, 2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15884/
PACESTMT7610.pdf [hereinafter FHFA Statement].
78. Id.

79. "Created by Congress, the Federal Home Loan Banks have been the largest
source of funding for mortgage lending for nearly eight decades. The Federal Home
Loan Banks are twelve regional cooperative banks that lending institutions use to
finance housing and economic development in local communities."
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take three actions with regard to their local PACE loan programs: (1) in existing PACE-encumbered mortgages, waive their prohibitions against senior
municipal liens; (2) take specific steps to protect themselves in PACE jurisdictions; and (3) ensure that any pledged collateral is free of PACE liens. 8 1
On the same day, the United States Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
which "charter[s], regulate[s], and supervise[s] all national banks," 8 issued a
guidance memorandum to warn national banks and lending institutions of the
potential effects of PACE lien priority and to advise lenders of their options
83
when seeking to mitigate a PACE lien's effects. The OCC warned that the
lien priority raised significant concerns for mortgage lenders and investors.84
Loan Banks, History, http://www.fhlbanks.com/overview history.htm (last visited
Feb. 23, 2011).
80. The specific actions recommended by FHFA to protect themselves in such
jurisdictions were
[1] Adjusting loan-to-value ratios to reflect the maximum permissible
PACE loan amount available to borrowers in PACE jurisdictions; [2] Ensuring that loan covenants require approval/consent for any PACE loan;
[3] Tightening borrower debt-to-income ratios to account for additional
obligations associated with possible future PACE loans; [and 4] Ensuring
that mortgages on properties in a jurisdiction offering PACE-like programs satisfy all applicable federal and state lending regulations and guidance.
FHFA Statement, supra note 77.
8 1. Id.

82. Office

of the

Comptroller

of the

Currency,

About

the

OCC,

http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/index-about.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
83. OCC Bulletin No. 2010-25, Memorandum from Timothy Long, Senior

Deputy Comptroller for Bank Supervision Policy and Chief Nat'l Bank Exam'r, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Chief Exec. Officers of All Nat'1 Banks,
Dep't and Div. Heads, and All Examining Personnel, Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, Supervisory Guidance, at *1, (Jul. 22, 2010), availableat 2010
WL 2706317 [hereinafter OCC Statement].
84. Id Government agencies were not the only concerned group raising the
alarm. On July 23, 2010, the American Land Title Association (ALTA) wrote an
open letter to FHFA on behalf of ALTA's 3700 members. Letter from Kurt Pfotenhauer, Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Land Title Ass'n, to Alfred M. Pollard, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (July 23, 2010), available at http://www.alta.
ALTA is
org/advocacy/advocacyupdate/attachments/10-0723_AlfredPollard.pdf.
the national trade association for real estate settlement service and abstract and title
insurance companies. Id. The letter asked for "guidance in resolving uncertainty
surrounding these programs." Id Specifically, the letter was concerned with whether
PACE financing would be considered loans (or federally related mortgages) for the
purpose of compliance with the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (RESPA).
Id. The letter pointed out to FHFA that noncompliance with established lien recording regulations and procedures could result in an inability to adequately weigh risks,
delays, and cancellations of real estate transactions due to an inability to adequately
insure properties without knowledge of existing liens, as well as "significant losses
due to fraud." Id
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The OCC suggested four measures to national banks to mitigate their exposure and protect the positions of investors: "[1] [p]rocuring loss guarantees
from the respective states or municipalities; [2] [e]scrowing tax assessmentrelated debt . . .; [3] [r]e-evaluating and adjusting home equity line[s] of credit . . . ; and [4] [i]n the case of commercial properties, securing additional

collateral." 85
According to the interest group PACENow, the impact of these announcements was an effective halt to all active and potential PACE programs
across the United States.86 Given the recommendations of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, lenders immediately refused any and all mortgages associated
with PACE liens.87 As a result, no state has enacted PACE enabling legislation since May 2010.8 The unilateral refusal of federal lending agencies to
purchase the mortgages of any PACE-encumbered properties, regardless of
the strength of their underwriting or likelihood of default, represents the most
aggressive action then available to those agencies.
PACENow responded with a comprehensive presentation to the Senate
Banking Committee entitled "Property Assessed Clean Energy Districts:
States Rights, Benefits & Responses to FHFA/Regulator Overreach," in
which it presented seven arguments in response to the federal regulators'
criticism.
Stated concisely, PACENow made three key responses: (1) in
ignoring state assessment rights, FHFA mischaracterized PACE programs as
granting loans; (2) because only the portions of PACE liens in arrears90 are
accelerated into senior positions, PACE lien seniority does not significantly
harm creditors; and (3) collateral-based programs, the type of borrowing
85. OCC Statement, supra note 83, at *1. Reiterating the position previously
stated by FHFA, the OCC also made clear that it "supports commercial and residential energy lending when such lending programs observe existing lien preference,
ensure prudent underwriting, and comply with appropriate consumer protections." Id.
at *2.
86. PACENow, supra note 24, at 3; see also Tomich, supra note 5 ("The position [articulated in the July 6 FHFA Statement] in effect shut down PACE programs
across the country.").
87. Tomich, supra note 5 (quoting Max Cook, CEO of Missouri Bankers Association). As of 2008, Fannie and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed approximately
half of all residential mortgages in the United States, giving them effective control
over the mortgage resale market. Charles Duhigg, A Trickle That Turned into a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
According to FHFA, Fannie Mae and
2008/07/ I/business/llripple.html?_r-l.
Freddie Mac supply $5.9 trillion dollars for the U.S. mortgage market and financial
institutions. FHFA Statement, supra note 77.
88. See sources cited supra note 32; see also supra Part II.C, chart.
89. See PACENow, supra note 24, at 19-26.

90. An account in arrears is overdue in the amount accrued from the date on

which the first payment was due. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (7th ed. 1999).
In other words, the amount of the lien due would only be past unpaid amounts, not

any accelerated future amounts. See id.
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PACE relies upon, do not pose significantly higher risks than ability-to-pay
lending.91
By the time PACENow made its presentation, the House of Representatives had already responded to the uproar, introducing the subtly titled
"PACE Assessment Protection Act of 2010" in an effort to force Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac to continue facilitating PACE programs. 92 According to the
resolution, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be barred from making special requirements for properties affected by PACE liens.93
91. PACENow, supra note 24, at 19-26. Specifically, PACENow responded to
seven concerns raised by FHFA and the OCC. Id. First, PACENow addressed concerns regarding safety and soundness protections by pointing out that the Department
of Energy "guidelines were developed in concert with HUD, NEC, Treasury, CEQ,
OMB and the White House." Id. at 19. Second, PACENow argued that since only
past-due PACE payments earned seniority, with the remaining balance assumed by
new home purchasers, mortgage lenders were protected. Id. at 20. Third, it argued
that collateral-based financing (as opposed to ability-to-pay lending) "pose[d] no
more risk" than traditional financing methods, and its traditionally low default rates
meant the maximum potential liability to mortgage lenders was less than $200 per
PACE-affected property. Id. at 21-22. Fourth, it responded to the lenders' concern
over "unusual and difficult risk management challenges" by pointing out that landsecured financing had been "used for more than a century to levy special tax assessments through special taxing districts to fund . . . projects that serve a public purpose." Id. at 22. Fifth, it argued that the size and duration of PACE liens are well
within the scope of traditional assessments and that by reducing energy bills, PACE
liens operate exclusively to "improve[] cash flow to the property owner." Id. at 23.
Sixth, it reiterated that PACE loans do not "represent a key alteration of traditional
mortgage lending practice" because tax/assessment liens are well established and
because only "assessments in arrears" earn seniority. Id. at 25. Seventh and finally,
PACENow argued that "robust and prudent underwriting and consumer protection
standards" were in place to protect lenders and that assessments "have not historically
disrupted housing markets." Id. at 26.
92. H.R. 5766, 11Ith Cong. 2d Sess. (2010).
93. Id. Senators Boxer, Gillibrand, Merkley, and Begich introduced the Senate
version of the bill on July 22, the very day PACENow made its presentation. U.S.
SENATE, 11ITH CONG., BOXER, COLLEAGUES INTRODUCE LEGISLATION TO PROTECT
CLEAN-ENERGY INITIATIVES (2010), 2010 WLNR 14660880 [hereinafter CONG.

DOC.]. The language of the bill stated that
[1]iens or other property obligations that secure property taxes or assessments under a PACE program and are consistent with such [underwriting]
standards [contained within the May 7, 2010 Department of Energy guidelines] shall be considered to comply . . . and shall not constitute a default
on an existing mortgage or trigger the exercise of lender's remedies for a
property with such a lien. With respect to a property that meets the underwriting criteria ... [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] shall not require repayment of a PACE program tax or assessment in order for a property
owner to finance, refinance or transfer the property.
H.R. 5766. In her statement following introduction of the bill, Senator Barbara Boxer, the bill's sponsor, explained that "[t]he current uncertainty surrounding PACE
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Congress was not the only interested party to respond to the lenders. On
July 29, 2010, the Sierra Club filed a complaint for declaratory and equitable
relief against the FHFA, asking the court to enjoin the agency from further
disrupting the PACE process.94 The Sierra Club argued three counts against
the FHFA: (1) the FHFA violated the Federal Housing Finance Act of 20089'
by operating outside the scope of its authority,96 in that PACE did not
represent a threat to federal mortgage lenders and the FHFA's actions were
therefore either "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise
in accordance with law"; 97 (2) the FHFA violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirement for a notice and comment period" prior to unilateral agency action, in that it failed to follow proper notice and comment procedures prior to enacting the rules contained in its "Statement on Certain
Energy Retrofit Loan Programs"; 99 and (3) the FHFA violated the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), in that it issued guidance directly affecting the availability of an energy efficiency program and its "attendant environmental benefits" without a prior evaluation of the guidance's impact
through either an environmental impact statement (EIS) or an environmental
assessment (EA).'
In the following months, parties filed additional lawsuits, each of which articulated claims similar to those alleged in Sierra Club
v. FederalHousingFinanceAgency.101
programs is jeopardizing $110 million in federal investments for California communi-

ties, which is simply unacceptable. We must take action to protect these initiatives
because they create jobs, save homeowners money on their energy bills and help our
environment." CONG. Doc., 2010 WLNR 14660880. Regardless of Congress' stated
position, as of this writing, both bills are in the preliminary stages of consideration.
HR Bill Tracking 5766, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-5766

(last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
94. Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief at 1, 13, Sierra Club v. Fed.

Hous. Fin. Agency, No. CV 10 3317 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010), available at
http://www.drivecms.com/uploads/sonomacountyenergy.org/Sierra_ClubSuitAgain

stFHFAetal_07291 0.pdf.
95. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4603 (2006).
96. According to FHFA's enabling legislation, FHFA exists for the purpose of
ensuring that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "operate[] in a safe and sound manner,
including maintenance of adequate capital and internal controls" and "foster liquid,
efficient, competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets."
Id. §
4513(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).

97. Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, supra note 94, at 11.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
99. Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, supra note 94, at 12.
100. Id. at 13.
101. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,

supra note 48; Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, City of Sonoma v.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. CV 10 3270 EMC (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2010), 2010 WL
3012310; Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, People ex rel. Brown v.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. C10-03084 BZ (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2010), 2010 WL
3593758.
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The statutory violations alleged in Sierra Club and other suits align
closely with the larger dispute between supporters and critics of PACE financing: what is the nature of PACE bonds, and what effect do these bonds
have upon mortgage markets? These questions, along with the important
question of whether PACE lien seniority violates the Contracts Clause, form
the basis of this Law Summary's Discussion.102
IV. DISCuSSION
A. Major DisagreementsBetween PACE Supporters and Lenders
As negotiations between PACE supporters and federal lending agencies
broke down in May and June 2010, it became apparent that three fundamental
issues had become intractable. The first of these issues involved the appropriate characterization of PACE financing: whether local governments were
appropriately financing PACE borrowing through their land-secured financing authority.
1. Is PACE Funding Appropriately Characterized As an Assessment?
In its May 5 directive, Freddie Mac addressed "energy efficient loan
programs" and directed mortgagors that any liens created by such loans could
not be senior to a federally backed mortgage.103 The characterization of the
PACE program by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a "loan" was not accidental, but rather indicative of the basic disagreement between supporters and
critics of the program. In its complaint against the federal lenders, the Sierra
Club asserted that "[tihe May 5, 2010 advice letters wrongfully mischaracterized the PACE program as issuing 'loans."'" The Sierra Club asserted that
the advice letters were wrong because the program was an assessment against
real property and operated under "well settled principles of California [assessment] law." 105 Proper characterization of PACE financing is crucial because under assessment law government liens enjoy priority over mortgages
and private lenders; conversely, loans taken against the land are subordinate
to any preexisting mortgages. 1 If critics succeed in characterizing PACE as
a loan program, then there is no justification for granting seniority to such
liens, and mortgagors should be entitled to be repaid before investors.
102. This Law Summary avoids the more narrow statutory questions of the
FHFA's actions in light of the Administrative Procedure Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. This avoidance is due to this author's hope that effective negotiation between the parties would be a more effective resolution of each side's concerns than litigation over the manner in which the FHFA suspended PACE financing.
103. McClung, supra note 13 (emphasis added); McClung, supra note 75.
104. Complaint for Declaratory and Equitable Relief, supra note 94, at 3.
105. Id.
106. Elkind, supra note 31.
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To PACE supporters, the right to be repaid first is primarily important as
a tool to encourage private investment:
[F]irst lien status is critical to the success of PACE programs....
In the case of a foreclosure, the property value has often decreased,
resulting in ... no money to pay off any secondary liens. Where
this occurs . . . the junior lienholder suffers a loss. Because of the

risks associated with subordinated liens, there is currently almost
no demand in the secondary market for conventional junior mortgage instruments. Eliminating priority lien status for PACE assessments would render them effectively impossible to finance
through the capital markets.10 7
Regardless of whether this statement is true, the purpose for granting seniority to PACE liens is immaterial if the authority to do so is not contained within
the state power to levy assessments for public improvements.' 08 The question
then turns upon whether PACE programs legitimately fall within the state
assessment authority, rather than upon whether a certain program is viable as
a non-assessment.
PACE supporters have defended the PACE program as an assessment
based on the fact that the money is given not to individual homeowners, but
to properties; thus, the assessment "runs with the land" and binds subsequent
homeowners who purchase the property.109 Conversely, the FHFA defended
its decision on the basis that PACE loans are not an appropriate use of state
authority because they (1) exceed the normal size and duration of typical tax
assessment programs and (2) do not offer the same community benefits typically associated with tax assessment programs.110
107. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
48, at 12.
108. Alternative arguments put forth by PACE supporters may suggest that first
lien priority is not as crucial as they insist. PACE supporters point to a default rate of
less than two percent nationally in support of the low-risk nature of municipal bond
investing; thus, municipal bond investing should still be attractive as a low-risk way
to ensure regular long-term returns. See, e.g., PACENow, supra note 24, at 21. Additionally, the Department of Energy has recommended to states that they establish
"[d]ebt service reserve fund[s]" to provide pools of cash for investors in case of late
payments or nonpayment. See DEP'T OF ENERGY, GUIDELINES FOR PILOT PACE
FINANCING PROGRAMS 5 (2010), available at http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/
wip/pdfs/arra _guidelines for_pilotpaceprograms.pdf [hereinafter DOE Guidelines].
In other words, in rare cases (less than two percent) of defaults, investors will frequently see no interruption of returns. California's statute explicitly called for the
establishment of such "reserve funds." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 26124 (West 2011).
109. PACENow, supra note 24, at 7; see also Rep. Israel Speaks About Property
Assessed Clean Energy Bonds at Forum on Financingfor Clean Energy Building
Retrofits, supra note 3.

110. FHFA Statement, supra note 77.
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Most state PACE initiatives, including Missouri's, explicitly set a twenty-year maximum term for any PACE assessment."' However, most PACE
enabling legislation does not expressly dictate the maximum permitted liento-value ratio.'1 2 The Department of Energy (DOE), in a May 7, 2010 issuance describing what it considered to be "Best Practice Guidelines," stated
that PACE loans should not exceed ten percent of any given property's value,
with a minimum threshold cost of $2500.' 3 DOE presented ten "Program
Design Best Practice Guidelines" that sought to "increase the reliability of
energy and economic performance for the benefit of program participants,
mortgage holders, and investors," as well as three "Assessment Underwriting
Best Practice Guidelines" intended to reduce the risk of default.114 Thus, the
question is whether a maximum loan term of twenty years with a maximum
lien-to-value ratio of one-to-ten exceeds more traditional assessments that the
local municipality has generally issued.
A survey of Sonoma County municipal financing programs found that
the typical PACE lien in that county falls well within the boundaries of tradi-

111. PACENow, supra note 24, at 23; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.2800.2(1)
(West 2011). The Department of Energy and the White House have recommended
that the length of the loan not exceed the period of time during which the energy improvement would provide cash-positive returns to the homeowner (i.e. the period of
time during which the homeowner realizes a benefit on the investment). DOE Guidelines, supra note 108, at 3; Policy Framework for PACE Financing Programs, supra
note 55, at 5.
112. See sources cited supra note 32.
113. DOE Guidelines, supra note 108, at 1, 3. PACE supporters rely upon the ten
percent limitation in contending that a PACE loan's small size and cash flow positivity make such loans immaterial to mortgage holders, discussed infra at IV.A.2; see
also PACENow, supra note 24, at 22. In addition, DOE stated that its guidelines are
"significantly more rigorous than the underwriting standards currently applied to
land-secured financing districts." DOE Guidelines, supra note 108, at 1. Because so
many PACE programs have relied upon federal funds to provide for start-up costs, the
DOE guidelines carry great authority with most, if not all, local PACE programs. See
RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 4. These guidelines are crucial to PACE suppor-

ters' argument that a PACE loan creates no more, and potentially less, risk to all parties. See id. It does not follow, however, that these guidelines will prove binding to

state PACE programs going forward. For more on this point, see infra Part IV.A.3,
B.
114. DOE Guidelines, supra note 108, at 2-7. The Department of Energy guidelines, developed in concert with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), National Economic Council (NEC), Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of the
Treasury, were issued around the same time as guidelines issued by the White House;
both guidelines ensured that municipal programs were being conducted in as low-risk
and most effective a manner as possible. See PACENow, supra note 24, at 26; see
also DOE Guidelines, supra note 108; Policy Framework for PACE Financing Programs, supra note 55.
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tional land-secured financing."' 5 For non-PACE assessment programs, the
survey determined that the duration of assessment programs ranges from ten
to forty years, and the annual assessment amount ranges from $4000 to
$100,000.116 In addition, these programs are voluntary in nature and involve
property-specific lending for infrastructure-based improvements like PACE
programs. 1 In other words, the survey suggests that a PACE assessment of
twenty years at ten percent of a property's value falls well within the boundaries of a state's historically recognized assessment authority and thus should
not be mischaracterized as a "loan" simply by virtue of its size and scope.
FHFA's statement that PACE programs do not offer similar community
benefits as traditional assessmentsi also implicitly rejects the idea that the
improved energy efficiency of residential properties improves the community
in a manner similar to improved roadways, sidewalks, sewers, or infrastructure. PACENow points out in response that "cleaner air, local economic development [in the form of opportunities for local businesses to retrofit more
properties] and cost savings" all provide legitimate community benefits." 9 In
fact, PACE is the only form of land-based financing that improves homeowner cash flow in the form of reduced monthly payments for energy bills.120
While these community benefits may differ in kind from the benefits attributable to a new sidewalk or safer infrastructure, it is implausible to suggest that
the community benefits of an improved environment, increased business opportunities, and homeowners with increased gross monthly income are not
legitimate communal improvements of the type a municipality should be financing.
Simply put, a properly structured PACE program operates within the parameters of the state's traditional assessment authority, both in terms of size
and scope and the legitimate, tangible community benefits it provides. PACE
programs thus are properly characterized as assessments, entitling them to
senior status. The question arises, then, whether that senior status actually
harms-lenders when the property enters default or foreclosure.
2. Do PACE-Encumbered Properties Substantially
Harm Lenders Upon Default?
In a typical PACE assessment scenario, a parcel of property is burdened
by a tax levy of a specified amount, typically ten percent or less of the home's

15. PACENow, supra note 24, at 26.
116. Id.
117. Id.

118. FHFA Statement, supra note 77.
119. PACENow, supra note 24, at 23.
120. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss2/10

20

Larson: Larson: Keeping PACE

2011]

KEEPING PACE

619

value.121 Thus, if an assessment is granted against a certain property and the
homeowner subsequently sells the property to a new owner (or defaults on the
property), that homeowner's burden to repay the assessment is relieved (less
the amount in arrears), with the new purchaser becomin responsible for the
assessment (less the amount already paid or in arrears).12 Unlike a mortgage
or traditional loan instrument, default upon an assessment does not "accelerate" the amount due, which would make the full outstanding debt immediately payable.123 Instead, only the portion of the debt in arrears becomes due,
which would amount to one year's worth of assessments. 124 PACE supporters argue that this factor should alleviate mortgagors' concerns that they
would be subordinate to PACE liens; while the lender's right to repayment
would be subordinate to the PACE lien, the PACE repayment would amount
to a statistical average of two hundred dollars, not the tens of thousands of
dollars potentially outstanding.125
Despite the arguments of PACE supporters, the fact that the lien is forwarded to any subsequent ?urchaser does not necessarily alleviate the mortBecause of their size and duration, PACE asgage industry's concerns.'
sessments do present a potential barrier to a given property's marketability.127
Coupled with the current foreclosure crisis, reduced lending options for prospective homeowners, and a generally stagnant real estate market, lenders

121. See, e.g.,

RANCHOD ET AL.,

supra note 6, at 2; PACENow, supra note 24, at

25.

122. This result is justified, as the subsequent owner of the property would inherit
the benefit accrued by the debt, while the departing homeowner loses the benefit he or
she enjoyed while at the property. See DOE Guidelines, supra note 108, at 3.
123. PACENow, supra note 24, at 16.
124. Id at 25. Only one year's worth of assessments would be due because the
clean energy assessment would be due upon receipt of the homeowner's annual property tax bill. See id A failure to pay the full amount of the bill would trigger a default for that year's assessments. See id.
125. PACENow, supra note 24, at 16. For a detailed explanation of PACE defaults and the subsequent harm to subordinated lenders, see Posting of Todd Woody
to Green: A Blog about Energy and the Environment, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com
(July 2, 2010, 12:11 EST). The article explains that for an assessment of $15,000, if
foreclosure occurs with one year of assessments being unpaid, the amount in arrears
would be $1500. Id. "[A]ssuming a high foreclosure rate of [ten] percent," average
PACE seniority would be $150 per encumbered property. Id. That number is reduced as more realistic default rates are used. In Sonoma County, studies have shown
that PACE-encumbered properties default at a rate sixty percent below the average
default rate for that county. See PACENow, supra note 24, at 20.
126. See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 32, at 85-86 (explaining that "states would require homeowners to disclose the higher property tax obligation at the time of resale,
which might give some prospective buyers second thoughts").
127. Id.
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could reasonably feel that any additional encumbrance on a property
represents too great a risk to warrant the investment.128
In reality, any increased burden on a given property reduces its marketability once sold or foreclosed: no amount of safeguards can eliminate that
concern for lenders. However, this concern has never prevented municipalities from enforcing senior assessments.129 Thus, the scope of PACE is unlikely to have a substantial impact on lenders' ability to market their properties, and the nature of the program is such that it should reasonably improve a
property's attractiveness, rather than impede it. Lenders should not be concerned about PACE assessments, but rather should embrace them as a lowcost way for homeowners to improve the value of their property, assuming
the presence of underwriting safeguards to ensure lender protection.
3. How Serious are the Potential Effects of Collateral-Based Lending?
Lenders have expressed concern that absent strict loan underwriting
standards, the risk of default on PACE homes is too great, and collateralbased lending practices incentivize a homeowner to default on his or her
property.1 30 Because PACE loans operate by virtue of an interest in the benefitted property rather than an assurance of the borrower's ability to repay the
balance of the debt, lenders are concerned that high-risk borrowers will not be
prevented from taking on PACE loans that exceed their ability to pay and will
ultimately choose foreclosure.' 3' This result is based on the allegedly loose
underwriting standards employed by PACE programs around the country.132
Thus, lending authorities have advocated a debt-to-income test to help potential lenders better establish a borrower's ability to pay.133
In response, PACE advocates point to the historically low default rates
on property tax payments (typically below two percent)13 4 and the Department of Energy's guidelines that direct PACE programs to establish "[debt
128. See, e.g., FHFA Statement, supra note 77.
129. See, e.g., Dunlap v. County of Gallatin, 15 111.7 (1853).
130. FHFA Statement, supra note 77. The threat of default is especially concerning to lenders in PACE situations, given that a homeowner with a PACE loan is not
responsible for the balance of the loan upon default. See id.
131. 1d. In a March 25, 2010 article published in The Wall Street Journal,former
FHFA attorney David Felt articulated the FHFA's fear that PACE programs have "all
the right economics to take off in a huge way and then cause huge losses" and that
"[wjhen you're able to market to people who can't get financing for an ordinary
home-equity loan, that should set off alarm bells." Nick Timiraos, Fannie and Freddie Resist Loans for Energy Efficiency, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2010, at A4, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704534904575132123115802584.
html.
132. FHFA Statement, supra note 77.
133. Id.

134. PACENow, supra note 24, at 21.
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service relief fund[s]," which would protect investors by providing a pool of
capital in case of late payment or default.135 The DOE's guidelines also "recommend" that PACE programs (1) do not loan to homeowners without home
equity, (2) avoid lending to homeowners without a history of mortgage and
property tax payments for the current affected property, and (3) limit lending
to situations where the effect of the assessment is a guaranteed "positive return" (i.e. where the benefit to be derived from the improvement, in terms of
reduced yearly energy bill payments, exceeds the annual cost to the homeowner of the assessment, resulting in a "cash positive" transaction for the
homeowner).' 3 6 Creating a positive return to the homeowner ensures that
PACE funding will not decrease the ability of the homeowner to meet all of
his or her other financial obligations, but rather will put the homeowner in a
better position to do so than if he or she had not participated in the PACE
program.
There is no reason to suspect that the ratio of assessments to defaults
will increase substantially from the current level of less than two percent. For
example, in Sonoma County, California, the site of the country's largest
PACE program, there has not been a single default on a PACE-encumbered
home during its two-year existence; during that same period, however, the
default rate for Sonoma County mortgages was seven percent.'3 7 In other
words, in a county with over 100,000 homes, there were over 7000 defaults in
two years, but not one with a PACE lien assessed against it.'3 Thus, the
traditionally small amount of PACE-encumbered defaults, coupled with increased underwriting requirements, means that even a massive expansion of
PACE lending would be unlikely to result in material harm to mortgagors.1 39
In fact, none of the literature or argumentation by PACE critics has articulated an actualized harm to the industry: the entirety of the criticism has been
based on what could occur, assuming that PACE boards fail to adopt or adhere to any of the recommended underwriting requirements. For this reason,
PACE programs are unlikely to significantly impact lenders as long as federally approved underwriting standards are employed.

135. DOE Guidelines, supra note 108, at 5.
136. Id. at 6. It is this last guideline - that PACE financing be limited to "positive
return" situations - that PACE supporters credit with keeping default rates significantly below average, the theory being that homeowners who engage in cash-positive
transactions are less likely to default on mortgage and property tax payments, given
their increased financial positions. See PACENow, supra note 24, at 25.
137. PACENow, supra note 24, at 11.
138. Id.; see also Sonoma County, CA Detailed Profile 2009, http://www.citydata.com/county/Sonoma County-CA.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
139. A concession that PACE lending could be massively expanded seems unlikely. Even in Sonoma County, where PACE lending has been in place for two years
and has been widely implemented, the number of PACE-encumbered homes (1010) is
less than one percent of the total amount of homes and condominiums (110,511) in
the county. See PACENow, supra note 24, at 11; Sonoma County, supra note 138.
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However, PACE supporters' reliance upon DOE guidelines is insufficient because guidelines are simply that: guidelines. PACE programs that do
not accept federal funds are under no obligation to employ any underwriting
standards. Further, once a PACE program satisfies its initial period and begins operating exclusively on private investment, the underwriting guidelines
published by federal agencies carry no weight, and thus no disincentive exists
to impede municipalities from broadening their programs beyond low-risk
borrowers. While the underwriting guidelines provide a move towards better
protecting lenders, the guidelines need to carry meaningful weight before
lenders will cede their current position.
4. Does PACE Lien Seniority Implicate the
U.S. Constitution's Contracts Clause?
A question not comprehensively addressed during the initial period of
conflict between PACE's supporters and lenders is whether PACE programs
violate the U.S. Constitution, which forbids states from creating any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts."1 40 The issue is important because if
PACE is found to violate the Contracts Clause, then PACE would be invalid
in its entirety, rendering the debate over its merits moot.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the Contracts Clause provides only a weak form of judicial review under modem Supreme Court jurisprudence.141 While the clause provided a powerful means of judicial review
of state economic legislation throughout the nineteenth century and into the

140. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. For a comprehensive analysis of PACE and its
interaction with the U.S. and California Constitution's Contracts clauses, see
RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 7-16.
141. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978).
Although it was perhaps the strongest single constitutional check on state
legislation during our early years as a Nation, the Contract Clause receded
into comparative desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, and particularly with the development of the large body of jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment in modern constitutional history.
Id.; see also RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 ("Since the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme

Court consistently has held that this provision is necessarily qualified by states' inherent 'authority to safeguard the vital interests of [their] people' through statutes and
regulations." (alteration in original) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934))); Leo Clarke, The Contracts Clause: A Basis for Limited
JudicialReview of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 183, 184 (1985)

("It appeared that the [Contracts] clause would stand alongside the taking clause as a
rear guard protecting against certain types of retroactive economic legislation ....

The [Supreme] Court's enchantment appears, however, to have been short-lived.").
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1930s Lochner-era,142 only one modem Supreme Court decision has struck
down a law on the basis of its impairment of private contracts. 143
In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, the Court laid out its modem

approach to analyzing challenges brought under the Contracts Clause.
Under this approach, a court's initial inquiry is whether the state law or other
action substantially impairs the private contract.145 Impairment is substantial
when the regulatory change creates serious consequences for the private parties and when the law unforeseeaby intrudes "into an area not previously
subject to regulation by the state."I 6 If the impairment is substantial, the
court then analyzes whether the impairment can be excepted as a legitimate
public purpose carried out by reasonable and necessary means.147
PACE programs do not create serious consequences for private preexisting lenders, nor do they represent an unforeseeable intrusion into landsecured finance law. PACE liens do not impair the ability of secured lenders
to exercise any of their contractual or statutory rights against PACE142. Clarke, supra note 141, at 188-93.
The contract clause was the primary constitutional restraint on state and
local regulation of business until the late 19th century . . .. The vitality of

the traditional contract clause doctrine thus waned in the early years of
this [20th] century, and in 1934 [with the Home Building & Loan Associa-

tion v. Blaisdell decision] its death knell sounded.
Id. at 187, 192. In City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 507-09 (1965), the
Court "signified to virtually every commentator that whatever viability was left in the
contract clause after Blaisdell was gone." Clarke, supra note 141, at 194. Subsequent
decisions by the Court in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32
(1977), and Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978), indicate that the Contracts Clause is still effectual, but neither decision restored the clause
to its pre-1934 eminence. See RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 7-8.
143. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 (citing Allied StructuralSteel, 438 U.S.
234). In this context, "modem" refers to Court decisions made following the postLochner "switch in time," when the Court ceased wholesale review of economic legislation through the Contracts Clause. See id. at 8 (pointing out that "opponents of
PACE programs rely on a handful of dated state court decisions ... several of [which]
date back to the so-called 'Lochner Era"').
144. 438 U.S. at 244-45.
145. Id. ("[T]he first inquiry must be whether the state law has, in fact, operated as
a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. . . . Minimal alteration of con-

tractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the
other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of
the state legislation.") (footnotes omitted). If the impairment at issue does not constitute a substantial impairment, then the judicial inquiry need not proceed any further.
Id. at 245, 250 (finding that a state law that retroactively modified private pension
plan agreements did constitute a substantial impairment of contracts).
146. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 10 (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940)).
147. Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 411-12.
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encumbered property.148 In the event that the lender does foreclose, PACE
liens are not entitled to acceleration: following foreclosure, the municipality
is only entitled to a small portion of its lien because the rest remains attached
to the land.14 While this does constitute impairment of the preexisting contract, a possible loss of several hundred dollars 50 on a $200,000 mortgage
contract cannot reasonably be characterized as "substantial." 5 1 Moreover,
land-based assessment financing and municipal seniority have existed for
more than one hundred years, and this authority has been consistently upheld
when designed for the public welfare.' 5 2 Furthermore, as has been discussed,
PACE jrograms do not exceed the size and scope of traditional assessments.
Therefore, state enactment of PACE legislation is appropriately
characterized as "foreseeable" action in an area previously subject to regulation.
Because PACE assessments do not substantially impair preexisting contracts, a court should not need to go further in its analysis and should uphold
PACE liens as constitutional uses of state authority. If a court were to rule
otherwise, however, it would continue to the second stev of modem contract
impairment analysis - the "public purpose doctrine."' 5 If the state action
operates in the pursuit of "significant and legitimate state interests," the action should be upheld as within the state's qualified authority "'to protect the
lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people ....
PACE programs create cash-positive transactions that reduce U.S. energy consumption and homeowner energy bills but do not (at least if limited to
high-equity properties) force homeowners into situations where the debtor's
liabilities exceed home equity.156 PACE assessments promote the public
welfare by increasing community energy efficiency and the financial security

148. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 11.
149. See PACENow, supra note 24, at 16.
150. The assumption that foreclosure in addition to a PACE lien would actually
result in a loss to the lender is one that PACE supporters are unwilling to make.
PACE supporters argue vehemently that because PACE bonds are cash-positive and
designed to improve a home's energy efficiency and value, lenders will be better off
with a PACE-encumbered property than without it. See supra Part IV.A.2.
151. See RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 11 ("[T]he attachment of a PACE lien
to a previously mortgaged property does not substantially impair prior arrangements
between landowners and mortgage lenders, regardless of their priority.").
152. Id. at 11, 13.
153. See supra Part IV.A.I.
154. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,41112 (1983); see also RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 13.
155. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 13 (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 480 (1905)).
156. Id. at 11. This situation is commonly referred to as a property that has gone
"underwater"; that is, the amount of debt held by the homeowner exceeds the amount

of equity he or she holds in the property.
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of homeowners.157 Thus, PACE programs operate within the state power to
act in the public good.
The last step in the impairment of contracts analysis is whether the legislation is a necessary and reasonable means to achieve the stated public purpose.
While courts typically defer to legislative rationale and findings
when analyzing the purpose of a law, PACE presents a novel situation.1 59 As
originally enacted, PACE enabling statutes contained little, if any, underwriting requirements,160 and few states have subsequently amended their statutes
This is reflected
to reflect the DOE's advised underwriting requirements.'
in the fact that PACE supporters continue to rely upon DOE and White House
guidelines, rather than specific statutes, as evidence of lender protection.162
As a result, a court could reasonably conclude that absent express statutory underwriting requirements on the types of borrowers and properties eligible for PACE liens, clean energy legislation is not reasonably tailored to
achieve its public purpose.' 6 3 For instance, improperly administered PACE
programs fail to operate for the public good by exacerbating the problems
inherent in an already fragile housing market - increased underwater properties, increased foreclosures, and decreased satisfaction of private liens. Furthermore, such programs are not necessary means for achieving their purpose:
legislation with legitimate underwriting standards would more effectively
target those properties inclined to improve the public good. As a result,
PACE programs that fail to include strict underwriting requirements do not
provide the kinds of communal and individual benefits relied upon by PACE
supporters for their assertions that PACE liens improve the public welfare;
this failure ultimately undermines all arguments made in support of PACE
programs, includinA their constitutionality under the modem three-part ConFor this reason, analysis of whether a PACE program
tracts Clause test.'
impairs the right to contract rests on the same question ultimately at issue:

157. See supra Part IV.A.1.
158. Energy Reserves Group, 459 U.S. at 412-13.
159. Id. ("Unless the State itself is a contracting party, '[a]s is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure."') (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
160. See sources cited supra note 32. In The Constitutionality of Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs UnderFederaland CaliforniaLaw, Ranchod
argues that since "the imposition of PACE assessments is subject to reasonable conditions imposed under PACE programs," courts would find the legislation reasonable
and appropriate. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 14. While California (whose

PACE legislation Ranchod addresses directly) does impose such requirements, many
states do not. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 32.
161. See sources cited supra note 32.
162. See, e.g., PACENow, supra note 24, at 19.

163. For more on this point, see infra Part IV.B.
164. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1978).
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How do PACE supporters ensure that the underwriting guidelines they rely
on become law?
B. Effectively Resolving the Parties'Differences
While the DOE guidelines ensure the underwriting standards of PACE
programs at their inception, they provide no effective guarantee thereafter.
Lenders have no assurances that municipal programs will not begin to provide financing to less worthy borrowers and properties. Therefore, additional
safeguards must be put in place to secure the positions of mortgage lenders
and borrowers alike.
For the DOE guidelines to effectively limit the scope of lending to worthy borrowers, two possibilities are available: secondary implementation by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or original implementation at the municipal
level. For the reasons articulated below, this Law Summary advocates the
latter approach, under which state legislators would amend PACE legislation
to expressly codify the DOE-recommended underwriting standards.
1. Federal Control of Underwriting Standards
Via Mortgage Acceptance Protocols
One way to resolve the current dispute is for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to resume accepting PACE-encumbered mortgages, but only those mortgages complying with the specified underwriting standards. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac should purchase only those mortgages that (1) have savings-toinvestment ratios greater than one, (2) have assessment terms limited to the
length of the life of the improvement (or, in the alternative, twenty years), (3)
provide notification to mortgage holders of all placed PACE liens, (4) do not
permit PACE lien acceleration, and (5) limit assessments to ten percent of the
property's value.'6 5 Such a limit on approved PACE loans would sufficiently
protect lenders while allowing PACE lending to go forward.
While allowing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to control PACE programs
via acceptance of specified mortgages would ensure federal lending protection, such a solution would fail to resolve the deeper issues of PACE programs. Under such a solution, local private lenders would still be subject to
an interim period of potential high-risk loans without underwriting protections, and homeowners would still be able to assume non-essential PACE
debts that place them underwater on their mortgages or result in cashnegativity. Furthermore, federal implementation would allow Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac to continue to control local assessment law. Lawsuits filed
on behalf of PACE programs dispute the authority of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to control the PACE markets.
This challenge is unlikely to go away if
165. See supra notes 56-57.

166. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
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those lenders begin accepting mortgages of some, but not all, PACEencumbered properties. For these reasons, local-level underwriting more
effectively protects the parties involved, as well as settles the current disputes
regarding federal lending agency authority.
2. The Benefits of State-Level Underwriting Implementation
California has already taken steps to more effectively control the market
for PACE bonds by amending its PACE statutes.167 State-level implementation thus codifies the recommendations PACE supporters have championed:
that strict underwriting standards are the basis for the appropriateness and
constitutionality of PACE liens.168
Furthermore, requiring states to codify stringent underwriting standards
would allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to withdraw from the current debate and abstain from effectively regulating local- overnment assessment
law. Doing so would resolve the ongoing litigation
regarding the publication of their memoranda 70 and would allow well-deserving homeowners to
resume PACE-backed borrowing.
For these reasons, the best way to ensure the resumption of PACE financing and also provide adequate protection to lenders is for states to enact
amendments to their existing PACE statutes. As many states have already
begun amending their programs to facilitate lenders, this solution provides the
quickest and safest means of resolving the current conflict over PACE financing.

V. CONCLUSION
While supporters and critics of PACE programs currently appear to be
far from resolving their conflicts, recent actions by the executive branch and
some concessions from PACE supporters indicate that a compromise may be
possible in the future. In addition, recently amended established PACE programs include express statutory underwriting requirements that mitigate the
concerns many lenders had with previous PACE programs.
Assuming that the underwriting standards currently existing as guidelines are enforced as law in the future, PACE liens would be properly characterized as assessments, and PACE programs would not operate outside of the
scope of traditional assessment programs. Furthermore, if municipal clean
energy boards adhere to underwriting requirements, defaults by homeowners
with PACE-encumbered properties are unlikely to dramatically impact mort167. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 26121 (West 2011).
168. RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 6, at 4; Eisen, supra note 32, at 84-88; DeVries
& Lynch, supra note 4, at 6-7; PACENow, supra note 24, at 25-26.
169. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
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gagors because the underwriting requirements would make high-level defaults unlikely and because states would possess a bulwark of reserve funds to
pay investors in cases of default.
However, lending authorities are left with many questions regarding the
interaction of PACE liens with preexisting mortgages, registration of title
laws, and land-secured lending. This uncertainty arises from the broad application of a California-based program to other states, each of which has its
own unique laws and regulations regarding matters such as issuing mortgages
and real estate loans, filing property tax assessments, and approving borrowers. As a result, a PACE program designed for a single state was stretched to
its limit when broadly adopted by the twenty-two states in which PACE programs have currently been enacted.'171 Hyper-individualization may account
for some part of the lending authority's overreaction: as PACE legislation
swept the nation, federal lending agencies faced conflicting state-law issues
of priority, registration, and constitutional law, but lacked an effective mechanism for resolving these issues.
For this reason, the response by the White House and the Department of
Energy, as well as the appropriation of federal funds to initiate PACE programs, is an important first step towards creating workable PACE underwriting standards. The guidance of carefully crafted underwriting requirements
and safeguards can ensure that PACE assessments are limited to wellqualified, well-intentioned borrowers, thereby increasing both community
and private benefits. However, the assurance that PACE assessments will be
limited to well-qualified borrowers relies upon the assumption that clean
energy boards will actually employ the advised underwriting guidelines in the
future.
Given the undeniable national interest in reducing energy consumption,

rather than unilaterally halting the program's accessibility for deserving and
undeserving borrowers alike, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA would do
best to work with PACE supporters to ensure that all municipalities carry out
the advised underwriting requirements, preferably through state amendments

codifying the recommended underwriting standards. To do otherwise is to
dismiss the concessions and improvements made by PACE proponents and to
ignore the thousands of legitimate outstanding PACE liens. Given that PACE
programs constitute an evolving and workable tool for financing clean energy

improvements and improvinq the energy efficiency of the world's largest per
capita consumer of energy,
permitting all the potential benefits of PACE
financing to go unrealized is a consequence that is simply too serious to bear.

171. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
172. See Energy Statistics: Usage Per Person by Country, http://www.nationmast
er.com/graphlene-usa_per_per-energy-usage-per-person (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
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